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 Abstract 
 
 The over-exploitation of African elephants for their ivory has led to a dangerous decline 
in their overall population. As a result, they were granted protection under the CITES 
international trade agreement and given an Appendix I listing, which completely bans their 
international trade. I investigate the following question: under what circumstances is the limited 
trade allowed under the CITES ivory trade ban an effective strategy to stall the illicit trafficking 
of elephant ivory? Using Kenya and Zimbabwe as case studies, the feasibility of the 
preservationist and utilitarian viewpoints on elephant conservation are explored. This paper 
argues that the CITES ban on trade in elephant ivory is not the most effective way to protect 
elephant populations. Instead, limited and regulated trade should be instituted to ensure that 
African range states receive tangible benefits from elephant conservation. This could be achieved 
through keeping the more endangered forest elephants classified under Appendix I while moving 
the more stable savannah elephants to Appendix II. Community-based rights to elephants, 
specifically, should be put in place to ensure that locals living in close proximity to elephants 
have significant incentives to actively participate in elephant conservation, rather than 
participating in poaching or turning elephant habitat into agricultural land. While community-
based wildlife rights under an Appendix II listing for savannah elephants are in no way perfect, 
they are a more effective and realistic means of conserving elephants than the alternative of a 
blanket ban.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Introduction 
 
 In the decades leading up to the 1980s, increasing international trade in African elephant 
ivory led to the decimation of the African elephant population. Elephants have very important 
roles in their ecosystems, and their disappearance threatens the biodiversity of the entire region. 
The rapid decline in elephant numbers led many in the international community to become 
concerned about the survival of African elephants as a species. As a result, African elephants 
were entered into the listing system of the preeminent international trade treaty concerning at-
risk species: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna, 
or CITES. Since 1989, international trade in African elephant ivory has been banned. The ban 
has been lifted twice, once in 1999 and once in 2008, for limited one-off sales.  
 
 I will investigate the extent to which the limited trade allowed under CITES, such as the 
1999 and 2008 one-off sales, is an effective means of controlling the illicit trade in African 
elephant ivory. This brings up the question of under what circumstances do the opportunities for 
limited trade allowed under the CITES ivory trade ban serve as an effective strategy to stall the 
illicit trafficking of elephant ivory? I will argue that the CITES protection of African elephants 
would be more successful if it allowed for more extensive limited trade, rather than depending on 
a blanket ban. The most efficient way of achieving this goal would be to create separate listings 
for the genetically distinct savannah and forest elephants, allowing the stable populations of the 
former to be down-listed to Appendix II while keeping the endangered populations of the latter 
under Appendix I. I also argue that limited trade is most successful when local communities hold 
the rights to African elephants, which results in incentives for people to protect elephants as 
valuable resources rather than see them as pests or as threats.  
 
While several African range states and buyer nations will be discussed, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe specifically will serve as my case studies because they represent the extremes of the 
intrinsic divide between the preservationist and utilitarian views of the ban. Their differing levels 
of success in protecting their elephant populations, following their chosen strategies, highlight 
the importance of the feasibility of conservation strategies, not just the ideological beliefs behind 
them. Zimbabwe, additionally, is the founder of one of the most successful community-based 
sustainable use programs to date, the Community Areas Management Program for Indigenous 
Resources, or CAMPFIRE.   
 
A History of African Elephant Ivory, CITES and the Ivory Trade Ban  
 
African Elephant Ivory 
 
African and Asian elephant ivory has long been used in cultural and religious items 
ranging from prehistoric times up until the present day (UNEP et al., 2013). This paper focuses 
on African elephants, which are found throughout 37 countries in Africa, known as range states 
(Lemieux and Clarke, 2009, p. 451). Around 39 percent of elephants are found in Southern 
Africa, 29 percent in Central Africa, 26 percent in Eastern Africa, and 5 percent in Western 
Africa (UNEP et al., 2013, p. 15). The elephants in Southern Africa are savannah dwelling 
elephants whereas the elephants in Central and Western Africa are forest dwelling (Stiles, 2004). 
Genetic evidence shows that forest elephants and savannah elephants could be classified as 
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different species as they are morphologically, ecologically, and socially unique from one another 
(Blake and Hedges, 2004). Elephants are what is known as a keystone species, one that is 
essential to the African ecosystem because of the role they play in spreading seeds, recycling 
nutrients, reducing bushes and small trees, and helping maintain grasslands (Naylor, 2011). 
 
Because African elephants experience very slow population growth, their 
overexploitation has grievous consequences for the continuation of the species (Bulte et al., 
2004). Both male and female African elephants have tusks, males having larger ones than 
females, which continue to grow throughout their lives (Favre, 2011). About a quarter of the tusk 
is hidden in the upper jaw socket, and cannot be easily removed without killing the elephant. 
Bigger tusks garner bigger profits, which results in male elephants being targeted more often 
than females and produces skewed sex ratios (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). As the numbers of 
larger male elephants dwindle, more and more smaller elephants must be poached in order to 
meet the same weight demanded. Poaching, human population expansion, and desertification 
have all exacerbated the speed of African elephant population decline (Lemieux and Clarke, 
2009).  
 
There are several parallels between the situation faced by African elephants and the one 
faced by Asian elephants. The Asian elephant is considered endangered and the primary threat to 
their survival is habitat loss and deforestation resulting from expanding human populations as 
well as the human-elephant conflict that follows (UNEP et al., 2013). Only male Asian elephants 
have tusks, however, and these tusks are significantly smaller than African elephant tusks. The 
great demand of elephant ivory in Asia far outstrips the amount that could be provided by Asian 
elephants, thus the majority of ivory entering Asia is African in origin (Christy 2012).  
CITES 
 
 The call for the sustainable use of natural resources rose out of increasing concern about 
the safety of the biodiversity of key environmental regions, especially in developing nations 
(Barbier, 1995). The advent of globalization and increased international trade in wildlife and 
wildlife products has resulted in a global crisis in biodiversity (Reeve, 2006). The Convention on 
the International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna, or CITES, was formed in 
1973 to protect endangered plants and animals from being overexploited by trade (Reeve, 2006). 
CITES has 177 signatory nations and despite the fact that it is a voluntary agreement there are no 
prominent UN member nations who are not also members of CITES (UNEP et al., 2013). Over 
30,000 species are listed under CITES; not all of them are endangered and not all endangered 
species are listed (Ginsberg, 2002, p. 1184).  
 
 CITES has no enforcement power of its own; rather it depends on the cooperation of its 
signatories for enforcement (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). CITES uses certificates and 
permits to regulate trade in certain species through a system of three appendices. Appendix I 
prohibits international trade in a certain species, with only a few exceptions in which both the 
importing and exporting country must have permits proving that the trade will not be detrimental 
to the survival of the species (Reeve, 2006; Heimert, 1995). Appendix II is for species that are 
not necessarily threatened with extinction but might be if trade is not limited; commercial trade 
of these species, such as the American black bear, is carefully monitored (Lemieux and Clarke, 
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2009). Appendix III is a cautionary listing, meaning at least one member state has entered a 
concern about the status of a certain species.  
 
Because CITES has no specific means through which to measure compliance, it depends 
on reports from member states at the meetings of the Conference of the Parties (Reeve, 2006). 
The CITES Secretariat, its primary decision-making body, can receive assistance from qualified 
NGOs, including TRAFFIC, a wildlife monitoring organization; the International Union on the 
Conservation of Nature, IUCN; and the United Nations Environmental Program, UNEP. When 
member states do not comply with CITES mandates, other member nations impose trade 
sanctions on the non-complying state, which has proven to be a fairly effective means of 
compliance (Reeve, 2006). CITES can also sanction a non-complying nation’s trade in another 
CITES-regulated species (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). Shaming by the international community 
is the primary method of ensuring compliance (Danaher, 1999).  
 
CITES sanctions do not interfere with the working of the World Trade Organization 
because Article XX under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade stipulates that exceptions 
to GATT rules for free trade can be made for cases in which the well-being of a human, animal, 
or plant needs to be protected as well as when it relates to the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource (Wold, 2012). There has never been a case brought to the WTO against CITES 
sanctions and the two organizations are in communication with each other, as evidenced by 
CITES invitation to speak at the 2013 meeting of the WTO’s Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CITES, 2013a).  
 
 The Conference of the Parties meets every two years to make decisions on the listings of 
different species based on their level of endangerment (Gehring and Ruffing, 2008). Accuracy of 
listings is very important for both ensuring compliance and protecting species. An inaccurate 
designation of a species’ level of endangerment would needlessly restrict trade whereas failure to 
list an endangered species could result in its extinction. To prepare the listings, the Conference of 
the Parties consults scientists, the CITES Secretariat, NGOs, and state agencies. However, the 
final decision is made at the Conference of the Parties meetings by the member nations, meaning 
political power plays a significant role in the end result. Because there are no specific criteria for 
the listings of species, the issue of what is listed, which is supposed to be solely based on levels 
of endangerment, becomes politicized. Politically powerful nations pressure other member 
nations about what they believe should and should not be listed. In 1992 the eighth Conference 
of the Parties in Kyoto was supposed to discuss the up listing of the blue fin tuna to Appendix I 
but a backroom deal between the United States, Canada, Japan, and the powerful tuna industry 
led to the proposal being withdrawn by its author Sweden before it was even presented (Favre, 
1993). Decisions must be made with a two-thirds majority and are adopted within 90 days of 
their ratification (Gehring and Ruffing, 2008). Article VII of the Convention exempts pre-
convention specimens from any of the restrictions under the Appendices classification system 
(Sands and Bedecarre, 1990). This mandate was designed to allow stockholders to trade their 
existing stocks before a ban goes into effect, as well as continue to trade antique specimens. In 
the case of ivory this allowed for a great deal of abuse, which will be discussed in greater detail 
later.  
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The Ivory Trade Ban 
 
 At every Conference of the Parties since 1985, elephants and the ivory trade ban have 
been extremely contentious issues (Stiles, 2004). There are two primary threats to the survival of 
the African elephant: illegal killing for ivory to be traded internationally, and elimination as a 
result of direct killing due to human-elephant conflict or habitat loss. The CITES ban only has 
power over the first of these threats (Favre, 2001). Despite the fact that most ivory producing 
nations in Africa are CITES signatories, many of their elephant populations continued to 
plummet significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Pilgram and Western, 1986). Up to 
1,000 tons of ivory left Africa each year between 1979 and 1989, 90 percent of it illegal (Hitch, 
1998, p. 3) Prior to 1989, elephant mortality was around 20 times the level sustainable for the 
population (Hitch, 1998, p. 3).  
 
Some estimates claim that in the 1980s the population of African elephants fell from 1.2 
million to 600,000, primarily due to poaching (Barbier, 1995, p. 3). The enormous reduction in 
elephant populations resulted in significant public pressure on consumer countries, specifically 
the United States, European Union, and Japan, to put harsher restrictions in place (Sands and 
Bedecarre, 1990). In 1977, elephants were placed on Appendix II, limiting their trade through a 
permit system (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Countries like Kenya struggled with 
enforcement of this permit system because of their underfunded and corrupt wildlife service, 
which had few resources left over to put towards stopping poachers (Naylor, 2011). A quota 
system was established in 1984 to allow countries to sustainably use their elephant populations, 
but it was abused (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). In 1986 for example, Somalia set their 
quota at 17,000 tusks when their elephant population probably totaled no more than 6,000; it was 
suspected that Somalia was planning to export tusks poached in Kenya (Heimert, 1995, p. 1473). 
When the quota system failed, many signatories, mostly Western states, called for a complete 
ban (Gehring and Ruffing, 2008).  
 
In the summer of 1989, both the United States and the United Kingdom implemented 
bans on ivory imports, while both Japan and Hong Kong implemented increased controls 
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). In October of 1989, the Conference of the Parties met in 
Lausanne, Switzerland and voted to increase the African Elephant’s listing to Appendix I, 
banning all trade in their parts and ivory (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
South Africa, Botswana, and Malawi did not support the ban, insisting that their elephant 
populations were largely stable (Bulte et al., 2007).  
 
Conflicting Perspectives on the Ivory Trade Ban 
 
 There are two main conflicting perspectives on the debate over the CITES ban on trade in 
elephant ivory: preservationist and utilitarian. Preservationists do not approve of any kind of 
trade in elephant ivory, and support the full ban. Those who hold the utilitarian viewpoint 
support limited, sustainable trade in ivory and claim the ban is actually doing more harm than 
good. Both sides of the preservationist versus utilitarian debate have data that supposedly 
supports their viewpoints (Milliken, 2010). This philosophical divide over the use of trade as a 
conservation tool is, in many ways, irreconcilable (Ginsberg, 2002). 
 
 5
Preservationist Theory 
 
 Supporters of the ban, mostly from Eastern and Central African nations as well as Asian 
nations, claim that even a partial lifting of the ban, for countries with higher population numbers, 
would spur harmful poaching activity that would spill over into other countries without healthy 
elephant populations, and would also facilitate the laundering of illegal ivory obtained in those 
states (Walsh and White, 1999). Supporters of the ban are also skeptical of the elephant 
population figures put forward by opponents of the ban. They question whether the elephant 
populations examined could truly have been effectively monitored and counted in the amount of 
time claimed, especially considering that many of the elephants in those states reside in the 
forest, which presents additional surveying difficulties in comparison with the savannah. 
Surveying takes significant resources, which most African governments do not possess (Walsh 
and White, 1999). 
   
Kenya has been one of the most continuously vocal proponents of the ban. In 1989 its 
then-president Daniel arap Moi held a mass burning of confiscated ivory in conjunction with the 
implementation of the ban on international trade in ivory (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990). This 
gesture exemplifies Kenya’s strong opposition to the idea of utilitarianism, burning sellable ivory 
instead of using the funds from a possible sale for conservation (Heimert, 1995). Kenya focuses 
on the use of tourism, rather than the sale of ivory, to gain value out of elephant existence 
(Heimert, 1995).  Former Kenyan wildlife director Richard Leakey claimed that if ivory was not 
available because of a ban, then it would lose its economic value (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 
1999). Preservationists take great ethical and moral issue with the idea of legally being able to 
kill animals as sentient and intelligent as elephants (Bulte et al., 2007). 
 
 Animal rights activists, who see the killing of any animal as problematic, were strong 
lobbyists for the ban (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Preservationists put the existence value 
of elephants above the potential benefits of consumptive use (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994). 
Preservationists say that no one knows for certain what will happen if trade in ivory is resumed, 
and the stakes are too high if utilitarian supporters are wrong (Bulte et al., 2004). One of their 
concerns with resuming legal trade is that it will reverse the stigma around ivory consumption 
that was so hard to develop (Stiles, 2004). The lack of stigma around ivory trade was one factor 
that led to the enormous decrease in elephant populations in the first place (Stiles, 2004). 
Allowing limited trade would make ivory consumption more acceptable and would increase 
demand for ivory, further increasing the incentives for poachers and traffickers to enter the 
illegal ivory market.  
 
Utilitarian Theory  
  
 From a utilitarian viewpoint, Richard Leakey’s stance fundamentally fails to understand 
how economic markets function; ivory has economic value because people want to consume it, 
not just because it is available (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Attempting to eradicate ivory 
from the world market entirely cannot succeed in eliminating elephant poaching because if even 
one person demands ivory, a market will spring up to provide it, legally or illegally (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1999). Is it not better, utilitarian thinkers ask, to have a controlled, legal market 
in which ivory trading can be monitored and financial gains can be used as a tangible benefit for 
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community participation in conservation? Utilitarianism seeks to simultaneously preserve a 
significant portion of the elephant population, and maximize sustainable ivory production 
(Pilgram and Western, 1986).  
 
For utilitarian supporters, it is not a question of if resources will be used but how they will 
be used (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994). Elephants fall victim to the tragedy of the commons. While 
African states technically have ownership over the elephants in their state, their law enforcement 
is usually so weak that elephants are essentially open access resources. Economic value and 
ownership makes elephants an asset to be protected, incentivizing their conservation. A ban 
reduces the value of the elephants to people who compete with them for resources but do not 
reap any of the benefits of the existence of elephants (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994). Those against a 
complete ban tend to come from nations in Southern Africa, where the less threatened savannah 
elephant populations live, and at times actually exceed the carrying capacity of their range 
(Walsh and White, 1999). A total ban on trade in ivory eliminates a source of funding for the 
infrastructure needed for conservation in states that do not have much funding to spare. Ban 
opponents claim that foreign currency from ivory sales was a key contributor to conservation 
funds before 1989 (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990).   
 
For the governments and residents of African range states, a failure to gain significant 
returns on the sale of elephant ivory represents a lack of incentive to continue to invest in 
protection (Barbier, 1995). Controlled trade, therefore, is beneficial because even a small amount 
of gain from limited legal trade is better than no benefit from a complete ban, and incentivizes 
protection. Only producer countries who follow the rules and who had stable and sufficiently 
healthy elephant populations would be able to participate; limited trade is not designed to reward 
countries that skirt regulations or harm elephant populations in grave danger (Barbier, 1995).  
 
 The primary issue in elephant conservation centers on the problem of where to get the 
resources that facilitate the conservation of elephants (Favre, 2001). Ban opponents favor a free 
market approach in which the elephants can be consumptively utilized, thereby giving rural 
Africans tangible benefits from the elephants’ existence and leading to more investment in their 
protection (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Traditionally few benefits from wildlife parks 
actually accrue to rural Africans who live nearby (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). As a result, 
they have little stake in the conservation of elephants or any other animals in such parks, which 
all take up land that could otherwise have been used for agriculture. Corruption often diverts any 
of the money that would go to the locals, leaving them with very small returns from touristic 
earnings, which is the main source of revenue from elephants when their trade is banned 
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).  
 
 Sustainable utilization allows for both environmental and development goals to occur in 
conjunction, solidifying development to a greater degree than if the environment were being 
degraded (Duffy, 1997). Consumptive utilization can be seen as both a rural development 
strategy as well as a commercial strategy for development in African range states. It seeks to 
treat elephants in a humane manner while also respecting the right of people to control their own 
natural resources (Duffy, 1997). Western-style preservationist ideas do not, in the eyes of most 
African residents of range states, align with the goals of African development (Hitch, 1998). 
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There is also the question of whether the CITES ban places a higher value on elephants than on 
humans (Stiles, 2004).   
 
 The utilitarian critique of preservationists sees them as urban dwellers holding 
romanticized visions of the natural world, in which Africa is akin to some sort of Garden of Eden 
where people and livestock have no right to impede on the environment around them (Kreuter 
and Simmons, 1994). Even though range states are not compensated for the existence value of 
elephants, they bear all the costs associated with protecting elephants (Bulte and van Kooten, 
1999). In order for conservation to be worthwhile to range states, elephants must be seen as 
having greater value than livestock (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009).     
 
Since many of the citizens of African range states are very poor, it is unreasonable to 
expect the enforcement of a policy that puts elephant welfare above that of humans (Santiapillai, 
2009). Zimbabwe and other range states that support sustainable use proposed changes to the 
CITES ban that would allow for countries who effectively managed their elephant populations to 
be able to trade in ivory with the requirement that the proceeds would be used in a manner 
beneficial to wildlife conservation; this proposal was rejected (Heimert, 1995). The Zimbabwean 
vision of sustainable utilization of elephants holds that if people have property rights over 
elephants, they are no longer open access, and if poachers take them they are taking away future 
profits from the people (Heimert, 1995). So if there is community ownership of the elephant, 
people have a greater stake in the fate of the elephant. Appendix I status means there can be no 
profit from culling elephant populations, returning the elephants to the global commons and 
taking away the incentives for their protection (Heimert, 1995).  
 
Obstacles to Effective Enforcement of the Ban  
 
Continued Demand for Elephant Ivory 
 
The patterns seen in the illegal international trade in elephant ivory follow many of the 
trends that are apparent in most illicit economies. Illicit economies are extremely hard to 
eliminate and involve non-state actors who manipulate and evade the reach of even the most 
powerful governments and international governing bodies (Balaam and Dillman, 2011). Growing 
economic development in Asia has increased the demand for elephant ivory, even as it has 
decreased in United States and European Union (Barbier, 1995). China’s growing economic 
prosperity since 1990 has heightened its interest in luxury products made out of ivory (Stiles, 
2004). Elephant ivory is also often demanded for use in alternative medicine (UNEP et al., 
2013). Hong Kong has a relatively sizeable carving industry that caters to elites all over the 
globe (Naylor, 2011). Chinese officials claim to strictly enforce the CITES ban, but China 
remains one of the main destinations for illegal ivory, much of which travels through Chinese 
middlemen living in Africa, who represent a significant portion of the buyers of raw ivory sold in 
local markets (Milliken, 2010). As of March 2013, a pound of raw ivory was reportedly selling 
for over $1, 300 on the Chinese black market (Levin, 2013, para. 24).  
 
Balaam and Dillman (2011) point out that the consumers of illicit goods are just as 
culpable as the providers, if not more so. Elephants would not be poached if there were no 
demand for their ivory. In Japan, hanko seals, an important Japanese custom as well as status 
 8
symbol, are often made out of elephant ivory (Danaher, 1999). Many Japanese are seemingly 
unaware of the devastating environmental impacts that their demand for hankos made out of 
ivory cause. In 1988, 64 percent of ivory coming into Japan was made into hanko seals 
(Miyaoka, 1998, p. 171). Japan has come under international pressure for its use of ivory. While 
this pressure decreased demand significantly, there is still an entrenched market on which 
traffickers capitalize.  
 
Religion is one of the greatest drivers of consumer demand for ivory in Asia. China’s 
great economic growth and greater disposable income has provided the luxury of being able to 
not only look forward for what they want but also back to the past, specifically back to religious 
traditions (Christy, 2012). Many Chinese believe that ivory is an ideal material for religious 
objects, with the rarity and price showing spiritual devotion. A survey carried out by the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare in 2007 revealed that 70% of Chinese did not know that 
ivory came from dead elephants (Liljas, 2013, para. 7). As a result several informational 
campaigns have been carried out in China attempting to inform Chinese citizens that illegal ivory 
comes from elephants that were illegally killed, not ones that died from natural causes as many 
people believe (Levin, 2013). Despite these programs, many Chinese remain ignorant of the fact 
that the ivory they purchase is the result of the killing of elephants, and many still believe that 
ivory is the elephant’s tooth and that it can be pulled out and grow back (Liljas, 2013).  
 
Lack of Infrastructure 
 
There is no international police force to enforce compliance with CITES regulations; the 
assumption is that each member state will carry out enforcement at a national level (Favre, 
2001). Each country is required to have both a Management and a Scientific Authority, which 
are in charge of granting permits for trade within CITES appendices (Favre, 2001). If 
enforcement fails at a national level, however, CITES is severely crippled. One key aspect of 
enforcement is the ability of range states to properly measure their elephant population numbers 
and the causes of elephant death. Significant resources are needed to survey both savannah and 
forest elephant populations and most African governments do not have the funds or the means to 
carry out proper surveying techniques (Walsh, 1999). The advanced scientific capacity necessary 
to properly monitor elephant populations would require extensive financial assistance, scientific 
training, and technical support over an extended period of time.  
 
 Congo Basin nations, where forest elephants reside, have some of the worst infrastructure 
in Africa (Gross, 2007). The combination of poor wildlife management with the large areas of 
land only accessible by foot make monitoring of elephant populations very difficult. Intense civil 
conflict also hinders wildlife management (Beyers et al., 2011). During conflicts within or 
between countries, rule of law is not strictly enforced and environmental crime becomes easier to 
get away with (UNEP et al., 2013). Feuding sides often engage in elephant poaching to fund 
their cause with ivory sales as well as to feed their soldiers with elephant bush meat. Conflicts 
have affected up to two-thirds of forested land in Africa, where forest elephants reside (Beyers et 
al., 2011, p. 6). The 27 year long civil war in Angola displaced over four million people and also 
obliterated vast numbers of wildlife (Chase and Griffin, 2011). Since the end of Angola’s civil 
war in 2002, elephant populations have been bouncing back, but there is still the issue of the 
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uprooted human population, which is now in competition with elephants and other wildlife for 
land.   
 
Donations from Northern countries, which previously may have invested a significant 
amount in conservation of elephant populations, are now slowing down because of the perceived 
success of the ban, taking away funding still crucial for enforcement (Burton, 1999). Yet African 
wildlife departments desperately need these donations due to the hardships they face from their 
lack of necessary infrastructure and capital, which limits their capacity to protect wildlife (Blake 
and Hedges, 2004). Park rangers often face great risks, and should be trained in bush warfare 
tactics in order to effectively combat dedicated poachers (UNEP et al., 2013).  
 
Problems with CITES Itself 
 
Unregulated domestic ivory markets abound in many countries in Africa, even in those 
without elephant populations of their own (UNEP et al., 2013). The political challenge of 
attempting to stop an illicit market is that all unregulated iterations of that market must be 
eliminated almost simultaneously, or else traffickers will simply travel to another location where 
enforcement is less stringent (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). CITES also has no legal enforcement 
mechanisms of its own; instead it depends on the cooperation of member nations (Danaher, 
1999). The system of local enforcement in many consumer countries, including Japan, is very 
weak, especially once raw ivory is carved up for retail sale (Danaher, 1999). Investigations 
following seizures are relatively rare, and when they are carried out they tend to be inefficient 
and ineffective (UNEP et al., 2013). In order to effectively implement the ban, enforcers must 
know the following: who is poaching, how poachers find the elephants, where they poach, how 
they transport the ivory, who they sell it to, how they evade law enforcement, how much they are 
paid for the ivory, and where the ivory is ultimately sold or exported (Lemieux and Clarke, 
2009).  
 
 One estimate puts the annual cost of wildlife protection at $305 million across Africa 
(Heimert, 1995, p. 1481). Some range states, such as Zimbabwe, argue that the revenue from 
ivory, and other elephant-derived goods, was the only way they could generate enough funds for 
continuous conservation of elephants (Heimert, 1995). Thus, the ban itself poses an obstacle to 
its own implementation, since without outside assistance, which is rarely given, most African 
range states simply do not have the funds to pay for the infrastructure necessary for the basis of 
conservation, let alone sustained protection efforts.   
 
Articles in the government-owned Zimbabwean newspaper The Herald reveal a frustration 
with CITES for not granting Zimbabwe full capacity to trade in elephants, something many 
Zimbabwean nationals believe they deserve (Sibanda, 2013). The Zimbabwe Council for 
Tourism blames the CITES ivory trade ban for the poaching that continues to occur in the 
country (Sibanda, 2013). This statement came in the aftermath of a deadly string of cyanide 
poisonings of several elephants in one of Zimbabwe’s biggest national parks in 2013. The 
destruction of elephants as well as other wildlife as a result of the poisonings reiterates the view 
many Zimbabweans hold that, currently, only the poachers are benefitting from Zimbabwe’s rich 
environmental and wildlife resources (Lubombo, 2013). 
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The problem does not only lie with CITES, however; the Zimbabwean newspaper The 
Standard reports that several conservationists claim that the cyanide poisonings may have been 
carried out with the knowledge and support of Zimbabwean government officials (Chimhete, 
2013). At least five Zimbabwean cabinet members were accused of being involved. It was not 
the villagers living near the elephant ranges who purchased the cyanide, people claim, but an 
organized international crime syndicate that involves high ranking politicians from President 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwean African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party in addition to 
prominent wildlife officials.  
 
Other species listed under Appendix I have run into similar problems as the African elephant, 
usually because they too are highly commercially demanded (Simmons and Kreuter, 1989). For 
example, the Appendix I listing of several species of Latin American parrots, trafficked illegally 
as pets, led to their black market price going up and resulted in increased smuggling. The African 
black rhino faced a similar plight; it was listed as Appendix I in 1976, three years after the 
creation of CITES. In 1976 there were 50,000 black rhinos in Africa but by 1989 there were only 
3,500 (Simmons and Kreuter, 1989, p. 48). The failure of CITES Appendix I to protect many 
commercially popular species indicates that the issues with blanket bans are not limited to 
African elephants.  
 
Reservations and Pre-Convention Specimens  
 
 CITES signatories have the ability to take reservations on individual species, which in the 
case of ivory can be seen as an unfortunate technical loophole to get around the ban (Sands and 
Bedecarre, 1990). Reservations allow member nations to opt-out of the restrictions of a certain 
species’ listing; they are treated as a non-signatory for that specific species and subsequently can 
trade it internationally without being subject to CITES restrictions (Heimert, 1995). Reservations 
are very controversial, though, and other member nations pressure signatories who take out too 
many reservations to stop. Reservations make the enforcement of the ban more difficult.  
 
When news of the impending Appendix I listing and its subsequent ban on ivory trade 
became public knowledge, ivory prices dropped considerably and ivory traders were desperate to 
find buyers for their stockpiles before the ban took effect. Hong Kong, a large part of the ivory 
retail industry, sent officials to Japan and other nations to lobby them to take out a reservation 
allowing for trade in ivory from Hong Kong. The United Kingdom acquiesced and took out a 
reservation for its former colony, a move that was extremely unpopular in the international 
community. All five of the ivory producing nations that opposed the ban, Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
South Africa, Botswana, and Malawi, entered reservations, as did China, the only ivory-
consuming country to do so (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990). The number of potential buyers that 
these nations could trade with significantly decreased, however, when many consumer countries 
such as the United States as well as the nations of the European Union implemented domestic 
legislation prohibiting the importation of ivory (Burton, 1999). Eventually almost all of the 
countries that entered reservations on elephant ivory withdrew them, and as of the sixteenth 
Conference of the Parties held in 2013, Malawi is the only member nation with a reservation on 
elephant ivory (CITES, 2013b). 
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 The WWF claimed that in 1990 approximately half of the 670 raw tons of ivory in Hong 
Kong was illegal or unaccounted for (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990, para. 51). The WWF said it 
was the United Kingdom’s duty to rescind their reservation for Hong Kong because the 
reservation was only granted on the condition that Hong Kong officials strictly control trade in 
elephant ivory, which they failed to do.  The opposition to the United Kingdom’s reservation for 
Hong Kong was largely limited to challenges by NGOs; no CITES parties had a formal response 
(Sands and Bedecarre, 1990).  
 
There is also a considerable amount of ambiguity within the CITES agreement about the 
status of pre-convention specimens. Article VII exempts pre-convention specimens from the 
restrictions of listing under Appendices I, II, or III (Matthews, 1996). This exemption was 
designed to be fair to ivory stockholders; it would allow them to trade their existing ivory 
holdings before the ban went into effect. The exemption would also allow continued trade in old, 
antique ivory specimens. Unfortunately, the pre-convention specimen exception was, and 
continues to be, abused by many actors, as well as states, who stockpiled large quantities of ivory 
right before the ban took effect.  
 
As explained above, nations involved in civil wars may be unwilling or unable to 
properly enforce CITES regulations (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). Corrupt governments allow, 
and even assist, poachers in transporting ivory across borders, oftentimes using misappropriated 
money meant for conservation. Corruption is a significant challenge to the effective enforcement 
of the ban as it weakens the possibility of feasible legal trade (Bulte et al., 2007).  
 
Local Incentives to Poach 
 
 Paradoxically, the existence of national parks sometimes contributes to poaching. The 
philosophy behind national parks is one that systematically excludes locals from any 
involvement or benefit in the existence of the wildlife (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). The 
locals see little to no benefits from conservation strategies that exclude them; the only other way 
they can get some use out of the existence of elephants is to poach them. Low wages amongst 
officials in charge of the parks means they often look the other way or are even complicit in the 
poaching. Game wardens may even poach themselves, often out of desperation for food or 
money.  
 
Property rights also play into the incentive to poach. The legal title of the elephant is 
given to the range state in which they reside, but since many range states are unable to enforce 
these ownership rights, elephants become open access resources (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 
1999). CITES suffers from a significant collective action problem, where the benefits of saving 
the elephants are enjoyed by many, but the costs accrue mainly to those that live in close 
proximity to the elephants’ range (Gehring and Ruffling, 2008).  The CITES ban reduces the 
value of elephants for the people with whom they compete for resources (Freeman and Kreuter, 
1994). The popularity of elephants attracts significant international attention and donations, yet 
this attention has not eradicated the demand for ivory or provided enough funding for 
conservation. 
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Only 10 percent of illegal ivory in the world is ever seized (Wasser et al., 2008, p. 1066). 
Amongst the 13 elephant range states in Western Africa, only 30 ivory seizures have been 
collectively reported since the 1989 ban; Senegal has not reported any seizures (Milliken, 2010, 
para. 13). However, 28 tons of illegal ivory suspected of originating from these states has been 
confiscated as a result of over 1,350 seizures across the globe (Milliken, 2010, para. 13). In 
comparison to West African range states, countries in Eastern and Southern Africa have reported 
over 3,300 ivory seizures (Milliken, 2010, para. 14). Ivory seizures cannot help the elephants that 
have already been killed for their ivory, but the ineffectual seizure system is a signal to criminals 
that the risks for poaching are not as high as they could be and this, combined with the enormous 
financial benefits, leads to more elephant poaching (Wasser et al., 2008).  
 
Transnational criminal networks use increasingly porous borders to skirt around law 
enforcement by adapting their methods and routes in order to avoid apprehension (UNEP et al., 
2013). Increased globalization and international trade liberalization has led to commercial and 
technological developments that increase the ease with which poachers and traffickers can move 
their product undetected (Wasser et al., 2008). It is especially hard to track an illegal shipment 
after it leaves its source country. Additionally, the country of export may not be the source 
country for the ivory. The internet is increasingly being used to facilitate the illegal ivory trade 
network. In the Philippines buyers and sellers of ivory openly share photos of available goods on 
social media sites including Facebook and Flickr (Christy 2012).  
 
Kenyan independent newspaper Daily Nation points to the increase in Chinese workers as 
contributing to the increases in both poaching and ivory smuggling through Kenya (Mayoyo, 
2013). China has invested in several large construction projects in Kenya in recent years, and 
many Chinese nationals have relocated to Kenya to work on these endeavors. The Chinese 
embassy in Nairobi, however, was insistent that it was Kenyan state corruption, especially in 
agencies involved in wildlife management, which truly caused increased poaching levels. The 
Chinese embassy also insisted that it was devoted to ensuring that smuggled ivory would not be 
sent to China explaining that when Chinese tourists land in Kenya’s main airport, they receive a 
text message from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reminding them not to buy ivory 
products (Nation Reporter, 2013). 
 
Lack of Local Incentives for Conservation 
 
Most locals in range states have no stake in elephant conservation, and many see Western 
preservationist ideas as counteractive to their own development. If locals do support 
conservation, it is mainly for the sake of the development of their tourism industry rather than a 
Western-style desire for the continued existence of the animal itself (Hitch, 1998). The rural poor 
in range states often directly rely on natural resources, including elephants, for their survival 
(Wittemyer, 2011). Economic crises can exacerbate the illegal harvesting of elephants, and there 
is a strong correlation between elephant deaths and economic condition indicators (Wittemyer, 
2011). Socio-economic factors play a significant role in the incentives locals have concerning 
elephant conservation. Poverty in African range states makes it significantly easier for organized 
criminals to recruit locals into poaching or to bribe, threaten, or partner with local officials in 
illegal activity (UNEP et al., 2013). Poverty increases the likelihood that impoverished locals can 
be recruited by criminal networks to participate in poaching, due to their superior knowledge of 
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the area. The rewards that they glean from assisting criminal poaching groups are small in the 
grand scheme of ivory trafficking, but for poor villagers these benefits are significant.  
 
The range states holding the utilitarian position, mainly in Southern Africa, claim that the 
significant decrease in elephant populations in the 1970s and 1980s was due to poor enforcement 
on the part of East African nations, not the pressures of actual demand for ivory (Ginsberg, 
2002). A complete ban, they argue, penalizes range states that were more successful in both 
protecting and utilizing their elephant populations, while rewarding those who failed to 
adequately shield their elephant populations from harm. This argument is often employed by 
Zimbabwe, whose elephant population has been steadily increasing since before the CITES ban 
took effect, in opposition to states like Kenya, whose elephant populations plunged dramatically 
in the decades before the ban and have only marginally improved since.1  
 
Range states have no way of being compensated for passive use of elephants, but they 
must bear all of the costs (Bulte and Van Kooten, 1999). The land that has been set aside for 
wildlife reserves is extremely valuable and, in the eyes of many locals, would be more beneficial 
for the community if it was devoted to agriculture (Moore, 2010). Namibia insists that the ban 
ultimately harms its conservation efforts because it reduces the value of the elephant for locals 
and denies them income that could be reinvested for conservation efforts.   
 
A frequently overlooked cause of illegal elephant deaths is human-elephant conflict, 
which occurs due to the close proximity of many African villages and towns to the range of 
elephants. Elephants are often killed because they pose a danger or a nuisance to their 
surrounding community; these deaths are unrelated to international demand for ivory (Heimert, 
1995). The incentives for people to kill elephants in these situations are very different from the 
incentives poachers have, so the modes of enforcement against this sort of killing must be 
adjusted accordingly. The killing of elephants for their bush meat is also responsible for a small 
but growing number of elephant deaths as other forms of bush meat become scarcer and local 
people become more desperate for food as the result of financial crises (UNEP et al., 2013). For 
some killing elephants is less of an economically opportunistic venture and more a matter of 
survival.  
 
CITES Approved One-Off Sales and Their Effect on Poaching Levels   
 
 CITES has allowed one-off sales twice since the ban was put into place; the first was 
approved during the 1997 Conference of the Parties and the second was approved during the 
2002 Conference of the Parties (Gross, 2007). The blanket ban on any trade in ivory lasted until 
the 1997 Conference of the Parties, when it was partially lifted for select range states in Southern 
Africa in order for them to sell a limited amount of their stockpiled ivory (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1999). Some argue that such controlled trade is desirable because it provides 
incentives for consumer nations to enforce CITES restrictions whereas under the ban they have 
no benefits; it also allows producer countries to participate only if their populations are suitable 
                                                        
1
 For a visual representation of the trend in elephant populations in Kenya and Zimbabwe from 
1973 to 2011, see Figure 1 in the Appendix. 
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enough; and finally, if constructed well it can result in more revenue going to the producer state 
rather than to middle men, which can be reinvested into conservation (Barbier, 1995).  
 
 During the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 1997, the status of the trade 
ban was a major point of contention amongst the different member nations (Walsh and White, 
1999). Several countries with large stockpiles of ivory contested the legal basis for the CITES 
ban, saying that by prohibiting the sale of stockpiles the ban was a retroactive application of the 
law (Sands and Bedecarre, 1990). As a compromise, CITES started a poaching assessment 
period, which ended in 1999, and came to the decision that three range states would be approved 
for a one-off sale from their existing stockpiles of ivory. Based on their stable elephant 
populations, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were allowed to temporarily move their 
stockpiled ivory to Appendix II status, allowing them to trade with Japan, the approved buyer 
(Burton, 1999). Tanzania and Zambia also requested to have their elephant populations be down 
listed, but they were denied (UNEP et al. 2013). There was a set quota of ivory to be traded, 
specific monitoring requirements to be met, and the revenue from the sale was all supposed to go 
towards conserving elephant populations in the seller countries (Burton, 1999).  TRAFFIC was 
enlisted to perform independent audits of the process to ensure that no laundering was taking 
place (Hitch, 1998).  
 
Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe all reported increases in their own elephant 
populations as a justification for the resumption of trade (Hitch, 1998). They also cited their 
steadily increasing stockpiles of ivory, from seizures as well as from the culling of problem 
animals, the value of which was another motivator for the resumption of trade. Japan was chosen 
as the recipient of the one-off ivory because of its traditional market for ivory, the fact that there 
was enough national demand to ensure that it could all be consumed internally, and because of 
their well controlled means through which to manage the sale (Danaher, 1999). Supporters of the 
ban were skeptical of whether an accurate measure of poaching could actually have been taken in 
that period of time; especially since forest elephants cannot be surveyed by air (Walsh and 
White, 1999). Kenya especially worried that even a one-off sale would stimulate enough global 
demand for ivory that the black market would expand and poaching would increase in all range 
states (Gross, 2007).  
 
The United States, several African countries, several South American countries, and 
some Asian countries were against the down-listing to Appendix II status, while Namibia, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Japan, Pacific Island nations, and the former Soviet bloc voted for the 
down-listing (Hitch, 1998). European Union member nations must vote in a block on CITES 
decisions or abstain from voting. Since the fifteen European Union member nations could not 
reach a consensus, they had to abstain from voting, giving the two-thirds majority to those in 
favor of the down-listing to Appendix II and the subsequent one-off sales. The sales took place 
in 1999 and 50 tons of government stockpiles were sold to Japanese traders (Stiles, 2004). The 
ivory sold represented less than 60 percent of the stockpiled ivory that the approved governments 
possessed from natural mortality, culling, and confiscated ivory (Bulte et al., 2007, p. 613). 
Revenues from the 1999 one-off sale amounted to around $5 million (Bulte et al., 2007, p. 613). 
   
 Some scholars say the lifting of the ban led to an immediate upsurge in poaching, 
especially in Zimbabwe, but also in states beyond those approved for one-off sales (Hitch, 1998). 
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Kenya did see an upsurge in poaching in 1999, mainly near its borders with Somalia (Bulte et al., 
2007). While this upsurge in trade occurred in the same year as the initial one-off sale, there is no 
direct evidence that this was because of the sale (Bulte et al., 2007).  Other scholars claimed that 
after the 1999 sale there was actually a five-year decline in poaching (Milliken, 2010). Despite 
the fact that conservationists claimed that the previous sale increased levels of poaching, CITES 
still approved another one-off sale in 2002, this time for Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa 
(Stiles, 2004). There is little actual evidence that the 1999 one-off sale directly stimulated 
significant demand for illegal ivory, but this may be due to the limitations of monitoring 
information (Stiles, 2004). Another criticism is that the one-off sales may have indicated to 
potential consumers that a resumption in general trade would soon follow, thereby reducing the 
stigma around the purchase of elephant ivory (Stiles, 2004).  
 
 The second one-off sale, which was approved in 2002, finally took place in 2008. The 
approved states sold 106 tons of ivory and once again all of the profits went towards elephant 
conservation (Milliken, 2010). Revenues from the 2008 sale totaled around $15.5 million (UNEP 
et al., 2013, p.12). China and Japan were both approved as the buyers of the ivory during the 
second one-off sale (Williams, 2010). Illicit trade has been rising since the 2008 sale, which 
some see as causation, but illicit trade has actually been rising since 2004, before the sale took 
place (Milliken, 2010). The WWF (2009) points to the increased involvement of coordinated 
criminal organizations as a possible explanation for this increase. It appears that one-off sales 
themselves do not necessarily impact illegal trade to a great extent because there are many other 
factors at work, and consequently should not be the main focus of those trying to halt illegal 
trade (Milliken, 2010).  
 
 One-off sales can be seen as relieving the pressure building up in range states as a result 
of their ever-increasing ivory stockpiles (Bulte et al., 2007). The one-off sales may have 
prevented states from going against the CITES mandate and selling their stockpiles out of 
frustration with CITES’ lack of congruence with their best interests. This line of thought 
suggests that one-off sales actually decrease the potential for future illicit markets for ivory 
supported by range states. In regards to the claims that one-off sales could serve as a cover for 
laundering, it would be extremely difficult to launder ivory in such a situation considering the 
amount of ivory being traded is set and is all carefully accounted for (Bulte et al., 2007). The 
cost-benefit analysis of this situation comes down to political judgments on the part of CITES 
and other member nations on whether a total ban is sustainable in the long term (Bulte et al., 
2007).   
 
 In 2007 there were an estimated 470,000 to 690,000 wild African elephants (UNEP et al., 
2013, 22). Since then there has been another decline in population and the latest estimates are 
between 419,000 and 650,000 elephants, mostly found in Southern Africa (UNEP et al., 2013, 
22). The 1997 down listing came with the stipulation of the creation of two global monitoring 
systems, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) and the Elephant Trade Information 
System (ETIS), for tracking elephant mortality and trade respectively, and to advise CITES on 
decisions regarding enforcement of the ban and possible resumption of trade (Burn et al., 2011). 
MIKE is designed to monitor changes in the elephant population through determination of cause 
of death (Kahindi et al., 2010). This data is compiled into the Proportion of Illegally Killed 
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Elephants (PIKE). MIKE tends to be more biased towards protected areas, performing fewer 
surveys on unprotected land (Blake and Hedges, 2004). 
 
MIKE data from one site in Northern Kenya shows that in a largely unprotected area a 
minimum of 35 percent of the 389 elephant carcasses found between 2001 and 2003 were 
illegally killed (Kahindi et al., 2010, p. 972). PIKE data has confirmed that elephants outside of 
protected areas are in more danger of being poached. ETIS data from after the 1999 one-off sale 
does show increased trade in illegal ivory, but this can be explained by China’s lack of regulation 
of its own domestic ivory markets, which are difficult to control (Bulte et al., 2007). The crucial 
difference between the one-off sale of ivory to Japan and the sale of ivory to China is that Japan 
is a small, island nation while China has an enormous population and borders fourteen 
surrounding nations, facilitating the smuggling of the legally purchased ivory to neighboring 
states (Christy, 2012).  
 
 The uncertainty surrounding the impact of the second one-off sale is due to the fact that 
the MIKE system is not fully operational enough to definitively prove whether or not the most 
recent one-off sale contributed to the intensification of poaching (Stiles, 2004). Until enough 
data is compiled to show for certain that the one-off sales did not have a significant effect, 
another one is unlikely to occur. The one-off sales are contentious to begin with and it takes a 
long time for them to be approved by CITES and then another few years to be carried out. 
Significant research goes into the approval of one-off sales; it is not a rapid process. 
 
State Sovereignty  
 
 State sovereignty is necessarily given up by CITES member nations in order to facilitate 
conservation. Conservation is inherently about power because it involves the distribution of 
control over natural and human resources by different actors (Ellis, 1994). The difference 
between non-detrimental trade and sustainable trade has been extremely contentious (Ginsberg, 
2002). Obviously most actors involved in the ivory issue have some degree of interest in the 
protection of biodiversity given that they are amongst CITES’ 177 signatories in the first place 
(Gehring and Ruffing, 2008). Problems occur because the benefits of protection accrue in 
different degrees and in different ways to the various actors. State sovereignty is an issue beyond 
just the enforcement of CITES, and includes decisions on deforestation and increasing 
agricultural land, both of which decrease African elephants’ range (Maisels et al., 2013).   
 
In 1989, the elephant population hovered around 600,000 and was above the level 
necessary to ensure their survival (van Kooten, 2008, p. 2013). NGOs capitalized on Western 
sentimentality around nature and simultaneously took away the sovereignty of African nations to 
decide how to utilize their own natural resources in ways most beneficial to their state and people 
(Kreuter and Simmons, 1994). Western NGOs have extensive rhetoric on the grave danger 
elephants face, yet they do relatively little financially to help African nations fund their 
protection (Kreuter and Simmons, 1994). This phenomenon is a clear illustration of the divide 
between the meanings and ramifications of conservation for Westerners versus for the residents 
of African range states. It is very easy for Westerners to demand that elephants be preserved, but 
their actions fall short of actually providing funding significant enough to allow for conservation 
let alone preservation.  
 17
The characterization of Africans as not caring about the environment oversimplifies an 
extremely complex situation (Moore, 2010). Both preservationists and utilitarian supporters 
claim to represent what the residents of range states actually want. Powerful pro-hunting groups 
have also weighed in, saying that it is imperialist to deny African nations access to their own 
resources and that hunters are committed to the well being of wildlife, so that they have 
something to hunt in the future (Naylor, 2011).   It may appear that African nations, like Kenya 
and Tanzania, were the impetus behind the ban, but it was primarily NGOs and Western 
governments (Moore, 2010). This leads to African locals being stereotyped as ‘environmental 
villains’ who will not save elephants unless there is something in it for them (Moore, 2010, 19).  
 
African range states have repeatedly been denied the rights to their own wildlife, first 
during colonialism and later through post-colonial governments continued use of the vestiges of 
colonial wildlife control strategies (Kreuter and Simmons, 1994). One catalyst behind 
Zimbabwe’s community based ownership of wildlife was to get rid of the colonial-era idea of 
wildlife as game for rich white men, and instead emphasize the rights of the people to their own 
natural resources (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994). The World Bank has proposed the 
commercialization of national parks, which would give benefits to elites in Zimbabwe, and other 
range states, but would be disempowering for many others, especially locals, who would lose 
any control they had over the revenue from their wildlife resources and touristic development 
(Duffy, 1997).  
 
Countries in Southern Africa point out that it was East African countries’ poor 
management that led to their plummeting elephant populations in the 1970s and 1980s, not the 
trade itself (Ginsberg, 2002). It is unfair, in their minds, that they are being punished for the 
incompetence of East African conservation efforts, when their management techniques were 
sustainable, while the East Africans are rewarded for inefficiency. The East Africans say a ban 
was necessary for them to be able to reevaluate and reorganize their strategies of enforcement 
while poaching pressure was low (Ginsberg, 2002). Southern African nations see a pattern of the 
control over their resources being held by Western states, which instead of rewarding successful 
conservation efforts, drives the whole system to cater to the needs of inept governments.  
 
Many lower income nations are frustrated by what they perceive as high income nations’ 
power to block trade that exporting countries, mostly lower income, deem acceptable (Favre, 
2001). As explained earlier, the CITES ban leads to steadily increasing stockpiles of confiscated 
ivory that cannot be used, which frustrates range states and causes troubles in international 
negotiations (van Kooten, 2008). Failure to receive adequate income from ivory trade means 
fewer funds are available to put towards conservation. This is a serious issue since only1.5 
percent of elephants’ 5.9 million square kilometer range is protected (Barbier, 1995, p. 3). 
Properly monitoring elephant populations requires significant management infrastructure, and 
personnel to run it, all of which takes years of financial backing, scientific training, and technical 
support (Walsh and White, 1999).  
 
 NGOs play a significant role in CITES’ decision making process (Sands and Bedecarre, 
1990). African elephants, as flagship species, are able to garner increased donations as well as 
draw in funds for other species that do not engender as much interest on their own (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1999). Some scholars suggest that contracted NGOs have too much influence 
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over CITES decisions and do not take into account the needs or capabilities of range states 
(Reeve, 2006).  As has been previously discussed, the West receives the benefit of the existence 
value of elephants, or the knowledge that elephants live somewhere in the wild, even though 
Westerners rarely, if ever, come into contact with them in that context (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1999).  
 
 The very philosophy behind national parks in Africa is inherently exclusive, because it 
separates the wildlife from locals while simultaneously keeping the parks immaculate for foreign 
visitors, who are actually allowed to interact with wildlife (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). 
Despite the attempts to separate humans and wildlife, elephants still regularly leave the confines 
of parks, often to the detriment of those nearby. Parks need game wardens and rangers to protect 
the wildlife, but most African range states are too poor to afford the necessary expenditures to 
pay these protectors sufficiently. Conservationists estimate that around $400 needs to be spent 
per square kilometer to protect elephants and rhinos, yet in the late 1980s even Kenya, which 
was relatively wealthy for a lower income nation and also very dedicated to preservation, was 
only spending $10 per square kilometer (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999, para. 9). This 
spending is below even the bare minimum, and consequently leads to more corruption amongst 
those who are supposed to protect the wildlife, the game wardens and rangers, making them 
more susceptible to bribes to ignore poaching or even to the possibility of participating in 
poaching activities themselves.  
 
 While the corruption resulting from a lack of funding to pay park wardens and rangers 
could potentially be solved by revenue from sales being put towards conservation, general 
corruption within African range states as well as buyer nations is not something that can be 
solved by CITES. CITES’ focus is on protecting elephants to the greatest degree possible with 
the available resources. A total ban is not feasible because there are no benefits accruing to the 
citizens of African range states and corruption may be siphoning off money intended to protect 
against illegal poaching. Certainly corruption will still exist if some legal trade is allowed, but 
that is a necessary, calculated risk to increase the chances of elephants’ survival as a species.  
 
 In attempts to stem non-compliance with the ban, most of the pressure has been focused 
on range states rather than buyer states (Reeve, 2006). Many Southern African states want to 
resume trade to some extent, while other states that experienced more grievous declines in their 
elephant populations before the ban want to ensure that the ban stays in place, which they believe 
has and will continue to lead to a reduction in demand for ivory and, subsequently, a decline in 
the incentive for poaching to a level more manageable for enforcement (Burton, 1999). Both 
sides have legitimate reasons for their views, so whose should be given higher priority? A certain 
amount of sovereignty is forfeited by being a member of CITES, but to what extent should 
certain nations be subject to decisions based on the needs of others?   
 
Kenya clearly benefitted from the ban because before the ban their political and 
economic turmoil prevented them from being able to fund and maintain effective elephant 
protection measures (Heimert, 1995). Socially Kenya highly values a large population of living 
elephants, especially for touristic purposes. The ban was initially extremely effective for Kenya 
because it stopped the sharp decline in their elephant population, but their continued lack of 
infrastructure to properly enforce the ban has decreased its efficacy. On the other side of the 
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spectrum, Zimbabwe was reminded of their all too recent history involving the exclusive parks, 
primarily run by white Zimbabweans, and moratoriums on killing elephants for food or for 
protective purposes (Balint and Mashinya, 2006). The CITES ivory trade ban was unpleasantly 
similar in its demands to the racist restrictions placed on wildlife under the white government’s 
regime. Zimbabwe did not benefit greatly from the ban because their elephant populations were 
not in danger. The ban may have even undermined the goals of conservation in Zimbabwe 
because it removed a significant revenue source for seemingly no good reason, making CITES 
less legitimate in the eyes of many Zimbabweans. 
 
Limited Trade as an Effective Method of Facilitating Optimal Elephant Conservation  
 
Before the Ban 
 
The Kaokoveld region of Namibia had a rewarding sustainable use program in place in 
the 1980s, before the blanket ban took effect (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). The program 
was designed to address both the poaching of elephants and the poverty of the local people, who 
had lost most of their agricultural income because of a four-year drought. As the locals became 
poorer, they depended upon game hunting more for both food and funds. A conservationist in the 
area enlisted the help of a South African NGO, the Endangered Wildlife Trust, to fund the 
creation of a Conservation and Development Committee, which collected a $10 tax per tourist, to 
hire park rangers, and to enlist locals in the tourism business. The privately funded rangers were 
much more efficient at catching poachers than government funded ones, and they were so 
successful at slowing poaching that the elephant population in Namibia was quite high by 1987 
and resulted in increased tourism (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).  
 
After the Ban 
 
 After the CITES ban went into effect, demand swiftly fell in North America, Europe, and 
Japan through a combination of compelling anti-ivory campaigns, which increased stigma 
around the sale and purchase of ivory, and by national legislation making imports of most types 
of ivory, not just the international trade in foreign ivory forbidden under the ban, illegal (Stiles, 
2004). Some range states had increasing populations before the ban, and in others, populations 
continued to fall even after the ban took effect, demonstrating that political and economic 
factors, in addition to trade legality, determine trade volume. If the ban was successful, then 
elephant population numbers should have risen across the board, but they did not. Elephant 
populations have continued to decline in Central and Western Africa, but have increased in 
Southern and Eastern Africa. The ban, therefore, has failed in the two regions which, 
incidentally, were the ones that most needed its help in the first place, suggesting that perhaps 
another strategy, namely sustainable use, is warranted (Stiles, 2004). 
 
 The success of the ban does not only hinge upon decreased poaching, but also depends on 
whether enforcement efforts remain effective (Heltberg, 2001). While the ban has decreased 
global demand for ivory, it has harmed enforcement because there is more to enforce, but less 
funding to do so. The ban has not led to the recovery of elephant populations in all range states 
because the benefits are unevenly distributed (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). Evidence of 
continued population decline does not indicate that the ban was useless, though, because if 
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elephant poaching had continued at the rate it was going before 1989, the decline would be 
exponentially more severe (Bulte et al., 2007). Despite the many failures of the ban, this 
curtailment of the rapid population decline may well have prevented the catastrophic and 
irreversible elimination of elephant populations in certain regions, especially forest elephants. 
This alone can be seen as making the 1989 ban worthwhile initially. 
 
 The former director of Kenya’s wildlife service, Richard Leakey, summarized the 
preservationist justification for the ban by saying that even limited trade is akin to leaving “an 
open door to further catastrophic poaching” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999, para. 50). Yet, as 
has already been pointed out, markets do not function in the way Leakey seems to believe. If 
anyone demands ivory, a market for it will exist, illegal or legal. The CITES ban deprived 
African range states of an estimated $100 million in annual revenues, which, incidentally, is the 
approximate amount needed to sufficiently protect elephants in parks and reserves (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1999, para. 52).  
  
CAMPFIRE: The Model of Sustainable Utilization 
 
 Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, or 
CAMPFIRE, is a strategy for the sustainable use of environmental resources through local 
ownership of wildlife (Frost and Bond, 2008). CAMPFIRE was founded in 1982 by the 
Zimbabwean government, but did not have enough funding to be functional until 1988, when a 
local NGO, the Zimbabwe Trust, stepped in to run it (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). The 
Zimbabwe Trust focuses on facilitating development through means that do not result in the 
dependence that international aid agencies often cause. CAMPFIRE was created as a means to 
give local communities rights to the natural resources in close proximity to them (Frost and 
Bond, 2008). These communities have control over market access to their wildlife for hunting or 
for touristic purposes. Under CAMPFIRE, locals can cull some elephants, sell the hunting rights, 
and set up touristic businesses (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Between 1989 and 2001 an 
estimated $20 million has been earned by Zimbabwean communities, 89 percent of which was a 
result of hunting for sport (Frost and Bond, 2008, p. 776).   
 
 Rural District Councils, or RDCs, are given control over the rights to the wildlife based 
on a quota system, which hinges on the population numbers in the district (Frost and Bond, 
2008). Higher populations mean higher quotas of elephants that can be utilized, which translates 
into higher profits for the community. RDCs can sell safari operators the rights to use their land. 
The guiding assumption behind CAMPFIRE is that the revenues created by community 
ownership of wildlife present enough of an incentive for the community to adjust their land and 
wildlife use to sustainable levels. The benefits must outweigh the costs for such a program to 
work.  
 
One of CAMPFIRE’s drawbacks is that it relies on the leadership of RDCs to facilitate 
the project, and this often results in more authority with the councils than with the people. The 
CAMPFIRE branch in the Mahenya region of Zimbabwe was one of the most successful at 
giving power to the community members (Balint and Mashinya, 2006). The Mahenya locals used 
to elect a council to voice their needs and opinions to the Rural District Councils. However after 
2000, political and economic unrest in Zimbabwe led to a decrease in tourism, crippling 
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CAMPFIRE’s main source of income. President Mugabe’s poor economic leadership has led to 
RDCs not having enough money to implement CAMPFIRE correctly and reducing their 
legitimacy amongst locals (Campbell et al., 2001). In Mahenya the Rural District Council was 
taken over by the relatives of the local chief, and the citizen led council was disbanded leaving 
the people in Mahenya with little faith in CAMPFIRE (Balint and Mashinya, 2006).  
 
The revenue from CAMPFIRE is designed to go to the community rather than to the 
central government (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Funds are also used to repay villagers 
whose crops have been destroyed by elephants. At this point, the majority of the benefits appear 
to be going primarily to elites within Zimbabwean communities; the poor and women especially 
are not seeing many benefits at all (Frost and Bond, 2008). Despite this, CAMPFIRE is still a 
viable model for sustainable use of wildlife. It is still expanding and evolving, so its shortcoming 
should not be equated with failure.  
 
The Level of Success of Limited Sales 
 
Judging the success of limited sales comes down to what criteria are used to define 
success. Does limited trade benefiting locals completely eliminate the illicit ivory trafficking, the 
highest possible level of success? No, it does not. Is it able to slow the decline of elephants in a 
more effective manner than a blanket ban? Yes; while increasing the stakes and profits for locals 
in elephant conservation does not completely solve the problem of poaching, it is, simply, the 
most feasible solution considering the current resources available to the elephant conservation 
effort. The most successful attempts at consumptive use type programs occur when communities 
have rights to the wildlife, which counteracts the effects of the open-access status of wildlife. 
When local people have the rights, more revenue can go back to them, and because they are 
trading in their own resource, they have a stronger incentive to invest in its protection from 
illegal harvesting (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).  
 
A return to open trade would undoubtedly be disastrous for the African elephant 
population, but a continuation of the blanket ban is also not optimal for the long-term survival of 
the species (Favre, 2011). The current system of stockpiling confiscated ivory is a financial drain 
on the governments of range states and increases the incentives to disobey the CITES mandate. 
Stockpiled ivory represents significant funds that could be put towards conservation efforts, 
instead of sitting passively in a warehouse or, in extreme cases, being burned by government 
leaders as a political statement (Favre, 2011). The preservationist perspective does bring up a 
valid critique that the legalization of any amount of trade has the potential to lead to an increase 
in demand for elephant ivory. One of the main goals of effective trade should, therefore, be to 
ensure that legal ivory does not cause demand to rise to the extent that illegal ivory becomes 
necessary to meet the need (Stiles, 2004). 
 
Since 2007 there has been an increase in poaching levels on par only with what was 
occurring directly before the 1989 ban (UNEP et al., 2013). Growing demand in Asia, corruption 
in range states, and increased competition for land use threaten African elephant populations. In 
their joint report the UNEP, CITES, IUCN, and TRAFFIC all agree that in order to slow this 
recent upsurge in poaching, more investment needs to be put into capacity development for 
enforcement and also more effective use of land (2013). While ideally this would be possible 
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under the complete ban, so far this has not happened, which is why a strategy of sustainable use 
should be implemented.  
 
Limited trade would have to take into consideration the species of elephant involved, 
savannah or forest. Forest elephants, mostly in Central African range states, have not been as 
quick to rebound as savannah elephants, found in Southern range states (Gross, 2007). Limited 
trade would need to be restricted to states that show high enough elephant populations to handle 
trade. Consumer education is also a key facet of effective limited trade. Complete 
comprehension of the consequences of buying poached ivory should be made abundantly clear to 
consumer nations as part of a continuous attempt to decrease demand (Gross, 2007).  
 
 The most feasible method of sustainable use would be to return the African savannah 
elephant to Appendix II status while continuing consumer education campaigns as well as 
controlling the amount of savannah elephants that can be traded through quotas whose 
enforcement and success would be monitored through MIKE and ETIS data. Before the 1989 
ban a system of quotas was attempted, but failed largely because countries set their own 
“sustainable yield” quotas (Naylor, 2011). Now with the advent of data from MIKE and ETIS, 
CITES would have enough information to set quotas for nations housing savannah elephants, 
ensuring that the quotas accurately reflected elephant population levels. Community- owned 
elephant ranges could provide the quotas of elephant ivory to ensure that locals would have a 
stake in cooperating with the CITES mandated limits.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In response to my central question regarding the circumstances under which limited trade 
allowed under the CITES ivory trade ban is an effective strategy to stall the illicit trafficking of 
elephant ivory, I have found that while the CITES ban was initially successful in slowing the 
rapid decline in African elephant numbers, it has not been equally successful as a long term 
method for eliminating the global ivory trade. Consumptive use of wildlife allows for the money 
made from the sale of elephant ivory to be reinvested into the protection of the greater elephant 
population. While both of the one-off sales conducted under the CITES ban resulted in funds for 
conservation, more is needed to effectively sustain elephant populations. Moving savannah 
elephants from Appendix I to Appendix II would allow for sustainable trade in a less threatened 
population of African elephants. Community based ownership of elephants, as exemplified by 
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE program, would grant communities benefits from protection of their 
natural resources and would allow elephant populations to exist at a stable, sustainable level.  
 
 While the concept of sustainable use may be unattractive to some, it is the only realistic 
way to maintain sustainable elephant population levels. African range states simply do not have 
the infrastructure necessary to enforce a blanket ban without significant financial assistance, 
which Western nations are unwilling to provide. Sustainable use allows for the funds for 
elephant conservation to be generated by elephants themselves. While utilitarian strategy of 
community-based rights to elephants is certainly no panacea, it is the most feasible option 
currently available. More research should be done on the ability of different range states to 
follow Zimbabwe’s lead and implement a system of community ownership and sustainable use.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: A comparison of elephant populations in Kenya and Zimbabwe from 1973 to 2011 
(Perry, 2011).  
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